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Yataglass: Network-level Code 
Emulation for Analyzing 
Memory-scanning Attacks
Remote code injection attack
▌ Allows attackers to execute their arbitrary shellcode
►Various vulnerabilities can be exploited
◘ Stack overflow, Heap overwrite, Format string attack etc…
▌ Security researchers analyze shellcode to develop 
countermeasures
►Static disassembly is widely used
▌ Attackers can thwart static disassembly
►Encryption
◘ encrypts shellcode body
►Obfuscation
◘ inserts junk bytes between instructions
Network-level code emulator
▌ Emulate the execution of shellcode
►e.g.) Spector [Borders, et al. ‟07]
◘ extracts system functions issued by shellcode
▌ Advantage
►Never thwarted by encryption and obfuscation
◘ Encrypted shellcode is decrypted during execution
◘ Obfuscation cannot hide the presence of system call invocations
Analysis resultMalicious message
Shellcode
Instruction pointer
Emulation
sock = accept()
dup2(0,sock)
dup2(1,sock)
execve(“/bin/sh”)
Typical application of 
network-level code emulator
▌ Analyze shellcode collected by honeypots
►Honeypot is a decoy host that collects malicious 
network traffic
◘ Allows us to collect a lot of shellcode for various servers
►Many anti-virus vendors, security research institutes 
have their honeypots
▌ Network-level code emulators extract executed 
instructions and system calls of collected shellcode
►The result is used for…
◘ Behavior-based virus detection of anti-virus software
◘ Restoring compromised servers from damage
Memory-scanning attack
▌ Memory-scanning attack can evade network-level 
code emulators
►Uses instructions in the victim process, that are outside 
shellcode, as a part of shellcode
▌ Current network-level code emulators cannot analyze 
shellcode of this style
►No emulator uses the victim‟s memory for emulation
RET
call
return
Shellcode
Address space of
the victim process
Scans the victim‟s memory for a RET instruction
Stack region Code region
Why not use the victim‟s 
memory image?
▌ Using the victim‟s memory image is cumbersome
►In particular, when that honeypots collect shellcode…
◘ The analyst must prepare memory images of possible targeted 
software and their various versions
◘ No real victim process exists if the honeypot is low-interaction 
honeypot
▌ It is better to analyze shellcode without victim 
process‟s memory
►Enables us to analyze the shellcode collected by 
honeypots with less burden
►No need to  prepare many memory image
Proposal：Yataglass
▌ A network-level code emulator that allows us to 
analyze memory-scanning attack
►Infers instructions outside shellcode that a memory-
scanning shellcode scans for
▌ Victim‟s memory image is not required
►Enables us to analyze memory-scanning attack 
effectively
Inferred  instructions outside shellcode
call
return
Shellcode
Shellcode scans the victim‟s  memory for the 
instructions outside the shellcode
Yataglass infers the scanned 
instructions from the shellcode’s 
scanning  instructions
Scanning loop
▌ A scanning loop scans the victim‟s memory for 
instructions
►Example： scans for a RET instruction (0xC3)
1: mov  edi, ADDR (An addr. of the victim proc.)
2:  LOOP:  inc  edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC3
4: jne  LOOP
5:  call  edi # Uses the found RET
6:  CONTINUE:  # Shellcode continues
Scanning loop
for „RET‟
▌ Yataglass infers what instructions are scanned for
►Infers the instructions from the exit-condition of the 
scanning loop
►In this example, EDI register points to a RET instruction when 
the control exits from the scanning loop
Symbolic execution
▌ To infer the scanned-for instructions, Yataglass uses 
symbolic execution
▌ Symbolic execution executes a program without 
concrete values
►Values are regarded as symbols
►Operations are done symbolically
►A result of an operation is expressed as a new symbol 
that contains operator and operands
Instruction sequence
mov eax, INPUT1
mov ebx, INPUT2
add eax, ebx
Symbolic execution
eax = X
ebx = Y
eax = (X + Y)
A symbol for unknown INPUT1
A symbol for unknown INPUT2
Inferring scanned-for instructions 
by symbolic execution
▌ Yataglass forks if an unknown symbol is used as a predicate of 
conditional branch
► Executes both branch with appropriate constraints
► The instance of Yataglass which exits from the loop has 
appropriate conditions to exit from the scanning loop
► Yataglass terminates execution if the same loop is executed to 
prevent path explosion
Instruction sequence
1: mov edi, X
2:   LOOP: inc edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC3
4: jne  LOOP
5: call edi
Symbolic execution
edi = X (An addr. of the victim proc.)
edi = (X + 1)
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC3
Set constraint [edi] == 0xC3
Jump to [edi] == RET
More complicated scanning
▌ Using multiple constraints to find an instruction
Instruction sequence
1: mov edi, X
2:    LOOP: inc edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC2
4: jle  LOOP
5: cmpb [edi], 0xC4
6: jge LOOP
7: call edi
Symbolic execution
edi = X (An addr.of the victim proc.)
edi = X + 1
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC2
Set constraint [edi]>0xC2
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC4
Set constraint [edi]<0xC4
([edi]>0xC2) && ([edi]<0xC4)
->  [edi] == 0xC3 („RET‟)
Experiment: Analysis of 
memory-scanning attacks
▌ Obtained seven realworld shellcode from SecurityFocus and
Milw0rm
▌ Inserted memory-scanning code to the shellcode
▌ Compared execution result with Spector [Borders, et al., „07]
► Spector is one of the state-of-the art network-level code emulator
Source Target Obtained from Yataglass Spector
tsig.c bind SecurityFocus
7350wurm.c wu-ftpd MilwOrm
rsync-expl.c rsync SecurityFocus
7350owex.c wu-imap MilwOrm
OpenFuck.c Apache SecurityFocus
sambal.c Samba SecurityFocus
cyruspop3d.c Cyrus-pop3d MilwOrm
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Analysis result of real shellcode
▌ Analyzed shellcode for B/O vuln. in samba 2.2.7 
that incorporates memory-scanning code
▌ Yataglass extracted a list of system calls issued by 
the shellcode and that of executed instructions
SOCK1=socket(2,1,6)
listen(SOCK1,{2,61360,0},16) 
SOCK2=accept(SOCK1,0)
close(SOCK1)
dup2(SOCK2,0)
dup2(SOCK2,1)
execve(“/bin//sh”,“/bin//sh”)
Issued system calls Executed instructions (snippet)
…
push esi
push ebp
jmp edi
pop ebp
ret
popa
int 0x80
…
Analysis result of real shellcode 
(cont.d)
▌ We manually analyzed the shellcode by 
injecting it into the target server and tracing 
instructions with GDB
►accepts a network connection from the attacker 
by socket(), listen() and accept()
►redirects the stdin/out to the connection by 
dup2()
►executes /bin/sh  by execve()
▌ Confirmed the result generated by Yataglass
Limitations
▌ Yataglass cannot  infer instructions if the shellcode scans 
for a value in a range
►pop instructions ranges from 0x58 to 0x5F regarding registers
◘ pop eax=0x58,  pop ebx=0x59, …  pop edi = 0x5F
►Shellcode may use a scanning loop that accepts all pop 
instructions followed by ret instruction
◘ e.g.) save all registers, push garbage value, call the scanned pop and 
ret, and then restore registers
►Solution: fork() with assuming one of the possible values
▌ Yataglass cannot infer instructions when shellcode scans 
for a function signature
►Shellcode may scan for the first several bytes of fopen() to 
invoke it
►We think signature-based inference is useful
Related work
▌ Spector [Borders, et al. ‟07]
► Uses symbolic execution to extract behaviors of shellcode
► Can be evaded by memory-scanning attacks
▌ Detection of decryption behavior in polymorphic shellcode 
using emulation [Polychronakis, et al. ‟06]
► Counts payload reads followed by GetPC code
► Can be evaded by memory-scanning attacks
◘ But we can easily apply Yataglass‟s technique to this emulator
▌ Polymorphic worm detection based on static analysis [Kruegel, 
et al. ‟05]
► Extracts possible control flows inside payloads and finds a match 
between extracted control flows in multiple streams
► Yataglass extracts detailed behavior of shellcode used by worms
Summary
▌ Memory-scanning attack
►Uses instructions of the victim process as a part of shellcode
►Evades current network-level code emulators
▌ Proposed Yataglass to analyze memory-scanning attacks
►Infers the scanned-for instructions with symbolic execution
►Successfully analyzed memory-scanning shellcode without 
victim process‟s memory image
▌ Future work
►Automatic defense against shellcode
►Automatic recovery from the damage of shellcode
